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SUMMARY 
 
The study presented in this paper, is part of the Deep Green project, which includes the development of a power 
converter/device for employment in low-speed tidal currents. It mainly focuses on the initial steps to investigate the 
ways on how to minimize the risks during handling, operation and maintenance (O&M) activities of the full-scale device 
particularly in offshore operations. As a first step, the full-scale device offshore installation and O&M tasks are 
considered. The overall risk analysis and decision making methodology is presented including the Hazard Identification 
(HAZID) approach which is complemented with a risk matrix for various consequence categories including personnel 
Safety (S), Environmental impact (E), Asset integrity (A) and Operation (O). In this way, all the major risks involved in 
the mentioned activities are identified and actions to prevent or mitigate them are presented. The results of the HAZID 
analysis are also demonstrated. Finally, the last section of this paper presents the discussion, conclusions and future 
actions for the above-mentioned activities regarding the full-scale device. 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
ABS American Bureau of Shipping 
DNV Det Norske Veritas 
DP Dynamic Positioning 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
EMP Environmental Management Plan 
E/R  Engine Room 
EU European Union 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
FSA Formal Safety Assessment 
GL Germanisher Lloyd 
HAZID Hazard Identification 
HAZOP Hazard and Operability study 
HSE  The UK Health and Safety Executive 
IMO International Maritime Organisation 
MARPOL IMO Maritime Pollution convention 
MOB Man Overboard 
MSDS  Material Safety Data Sheet 
NAME Dpt of Naval Architecture & Marine 
Engineering 
NORSOK Norsk Sokkels Konkuranseposisjon 
(Norwegian Offshore Sector) 
PPE  Personal Protective Equipment 
RBD Reliability Block Diagrams 
ROV  Remotely Operated Vehicle 
SJA Safe Job Analysis 
SOPEP  Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency 
Plan 
VHF Very High Frequency 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ocean energy (wave and tidal) has the ability to supply 
more than 50 percent of the world’s electricity demand. 
Estimates made in 2006 demonstrate an electricity 
generation potential of more than 800 TWh per year for 
tidal power [1]. The above potential may be increased 
especially in areas which favour the operation of 
devices in low-stream tidal velocities. These areas have 
not previously been included in external market 
estimations since no viable technology existed for the 
low-velocity range. This issue has been addressed with 
the development of the innovative Deep Green project 
by using the Seakite, a novel device which is used to 
produce power from low stream tidal currents. The 
Deep Green technology has been estimated to provide 
the total electricity generation up to 300 TWh per year, 
which is equivalent to the electricity consumption of 48 
million households [2]. 
 
This paper presents the initial study regarding the Deep 
Green project; that is the minimization of the risks 
during handling/installation, operation and maintenance 
activities, particularly in the offshore environment. As a 
first step, the single Deep Green installation and 
operation are assessed. A thorough review and 
examination of the past and current risk analysis 
methods in the offshore renewables and oil and gas 
sectors is carried out in section 2 in order to achieve the 
optimum methodology for implementation in the 
proposed innovative tidal energy convertor design. The 
overall risk analysis and decision making methodology 
is presented in section 3, including the HAZID 
approach which is complemented with a risk matrix for 
various consequence categories. A specific description 
of the single Deep Green device with its components is 
explained and demonstrated in the same section. 
Section 4 presents the results of the HAZID analysis 
including the potential high-risk areas. The discussion, 
conclusions and future actions to be followed on the 
current study are finally shown in section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The subject of risk analysis, risk assessment and overall 
risk management is a widely explored field with 
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various studies contributing to its thorough 
examination. Particularly in the maritime and offshore 
oil and gas industry, risk analysis has developed 
significantly to ensure the safety of personnel 
employed, the protection of the environment and the 
reliability of the asset involved (either ship or offshore 
platform). Moreover, it has been used to highlight the 
operational excellence of the mentioned maritime and 
offshore activity (although in some cases, procedures 
have been accelerated after the occurrence of disastrous 
accidents). 
 
The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) pioneered 
in the development of such procedures addressing risks 
in their overall conception by introducing the Safety 
Case approach in 1992 [3]. In it, guidelines are given 
on what operators of each offshore installation need to 
do in order to “reduce the risks from major accident 
hazards to the health and safety of the workforce 
employed on offshore installations or in connected 
activities”. In this case, the owner or operator of the 
installation needs to prepare a safety case report and 
submit it to the HSE for approval. 
 
In order to strengthen this effort, the ALARP concept 
was also initiated in 1999 in an attempt to suggest 
measures to reduce risk “As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable” [4]. This concept is based on the ranking 
of risks from unaccepted to tolerable and finally 
broadly accepted levels measured by individual and 
societal concerns. If there are any risks in the 
unaccepted level, the related activity is abandoned and 
reconsidered so that the risk can be reduced to a 
satisfactory and controlled level. Furthermore, the 
Norwegian petroleum industry developed the 
NORSOK standard Z-008 [5], which provides 
guidelines and requirements for the implementation of 
maintenance programs for new and in-service facilities 
both offshore and onshore regarding risks related to 
personnel, environment, production loss and direct 
economic cost.  
 
The OREDA handbook [6] was another effort 
originating from oil operators to enhance the 
maintenance and operation of offshore structures by 
collecting data for the topside and subsea equipment. 
Various other efforts also address the issue of risk 
analysis and assessment of hazards. The reader of this 
paper is indicatively referred to the common BS/ISO 
17776 standard for the petroleum and gas industries [7], 
the marine risk assessment offshore technology report 
prepared by DNV for the UK HSE [8], the EU funded 
SAFEDOR project deliverable D4.5.2 [9]. 
Additionally, further studies refer to the IMO FSA 
approach [10], the DNV recommended practice on risk 
management in marine and subsea operations [11] and 
the ABS guidance notes on risk assessment applications 
for the marine and offshore oil and gas industries [12]. 
 
In the sector of offshore renewables, a combination of 
the risk methodologies mentioned above with the 
particular characteristics of the renewables field has 
been applied. DNV initially generated a report for the 
UK Carbon Trust setting guidelines to be followed on 
the design and operation of wave energy converters 
[13] as well as developed the offshore service 
specifications about the certification of tidal and wave 
energy converters [14] and performance criteria 
determined from the risk assessment methodology [15]. 
Various other research studies on offshore renewable 
energy devices include among others the work on wave 
energy converters [16], [17] and marine current 
turbines [18]. All the above show in the most explicit 
way the development carried out in the offshore 
renewable field in the last few years as well as the 
promising outcomes to be generated in the near future. 
With all this in mind, the section that follows next 
presents the risk analysis and decision making 
methodology suggested for implementation on the 
Deep Green project. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section of the paper, the suggested risk analysis 
and decision-making methodology is presented (Figure 
1). As is shown, the first step is to define the key 
activity areas in order to establish their boundaries and 
constraints in which the potential hazards will be 
identified. In this case, the key activity areas are the 
offshore installation and operation of the Deep Green 
device.  
 
 
Figure 1: Risk analysis and decision making 
methodology 
 
After this stage, the risk acceptance criteria are 
described in order to enable the analyst to compare the 
hazard identification results with a set of pre-described 
values. After this level, the core part of the risk analysis 
can take place. Initially, the full hazard identification 
Define key activity areas, 
boundaries and constraints 
Hazard identification 
process
Risk assessment (risk 
matrix)
Risk management/risk 
control options
Cost benefit assessment
Decision making
Risk acceptance criteria for:
• Personnel safety
• Environmental protection
• Asset integrity
• Device operation
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process is employed to list all the potential undesired 
events, which may impede the mentioned key activities 
(i.e. offshore installation and operation of Deep Green). 
This leads to the risk assessment stage, which may be 
either qualitative or quantitative. A number of different 
tools may be used such as the well-known FTA, ETA, 
FMEA and FMECA, the development of risk matrices, 
the Markov Analysis tool, RBDs, HAZOP and other 
available well established tools provided for examining 
the risk ranking, the reliability and availability of the 
examined system and sub-systems.  
 
After the identification and assessment of the potential 
hazards, the risk management stage takes place. In this 
case, the higher ranked risks are dealt with in terms of 
designing-out the potential hazards in the initial stages 
of the device, preventing the hazards from occurring, 
mitigating the effects of the hazards in case they occur 
or finally be pro-active for emergency response actions. 
The measures taken are then assessed regarding their 
cost-benefit value and eventually a decision is 
considered of whether to apply the specific risk control 
option or not. The final decision is then used in the 
feedback loop to update the other steps of the risk 
analysis mentioned before, improving the results and 
minimising any gaps identified in the process. It is 
important to mention that the updating and feedback 
procedure occurs throughout the risk analysis in order 
to develop a complete and systematic examination of 
the system under consideration. 
 
Bearing the above in mind, the Deep Green hazard 
identification approach is explained with more details 
in the following section. 
 
3.1 DEEP GREEN HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
APPROACH 
 
3.1 (a) Brief description of the Deep Green device 
 
In order to achieve the Deep Green hazard 
identification approach, a brief description of the 
technical characteristics of the device is presented 
based on the information gathered from the initial 
concept design stage. 
 
The Deep Green device is designed as a moving 
underwater power plant, which will be optimized to 
produce energy from low-speed tidal streams. By a 
reliable control system it moves on an eight shaped 
trajectory of about 300m length. The lift produced by 
the wing and its movement drives the turbine, which 
powers the generator. With a tidal current speed of 1.7 
m/s, the wing will move with a speed up to 17 m/s. The 
power will be transmitted through a cable integrated in 
the wire to a terminal at the seabed, which will be 
connected to the shore. The overall weight of the device 
is expected to be 7 tons. In Fig. 2, the initial design of 
the overall device is shown. 
 
 
Figure 2: Deep Green device initial design concept and 
main components 
 
As can be seen, Deep Green consists of three major 
parts: 
1. The wing (1) 
2. The nacelle (3) and 
3. The tethering system (4) 
 
The wing has a span of 12 m (chord 2.25 m, thickness 
0.3 m) and includes a set of equipment and parts such 
as a set of batteries for redundancy control, the 
buoyancy system as well as the struts that connect the 
wing with nacelle. The nacelle houses a turbine and a 
0.5 MW-generator used to produce the power required. 
It also includes a rotor (2), which has a diameter of 1.2 
meters and rotates at 750 rpm. Behind the rod, a rudder 
is mounted. The device is connected to the ground by a 
tethering system (4) including several single-tether 
pieces and a swivel as part of the seabed foundation. A 
Quick Release Mechanism (QRM) is used as the 
connecting point between the two main struts 
supporting the wing and the tethering system. It is 
placed at a distance of about 10m from the top of the 
wing providing a safe and a secure point in case the 
device needs to be detached from the tethering system 
for retrieval and maintenance. The Deep Green device 
will be able to operate in water depths of 60-120m with 
a water depth clearance of 15m from the surface of the 
sea when in operational condition. Having all the above 
in mind, the presentation of the Hazard Identification 
(HAZID) approach is shown in the next section. 
 
3.1 (b) Development of risk matrix 
 
In this section, the development of the risk matrix that 
is employed for the HAZID approach is presented. In 
this respect, various studies on the development of risk 
matrices have been reviewed, among others the study of 
[7], [10], [14] as well as the work of [17] and [18]. A 
consequence as well as a probability Table is developed 
showing the various levels of consequence and 
probability rankings accordingly. For the formation of 
the consequence Table, four different areas are 
considered. The potential risks for each one of the 
different risk affected areas are ranked into five 
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categories: A (minor), B (marginal), C (major), D 
(critical) and E (catastrophic) as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Risk consequence categories  
Consequence Personnel 
safety 
Environmental impact 
(recovery time) 
Asset integrity Operation 
A (minor) no injury no damage/contamination negligible damage 
< 2k £ 
minimal operation 
loss 
B (marginal) minor injury 
(first aid) 
minor damage/spillage, good 
effect of control measures (a 
few days) 
minor damage 2k 
- 20k £ 
short operation loss 
(few hours) 
C (major) multiple minor 
injuries, major 
injury 
major damage/pollution, low 
effect of control measures (a 
few days to a month) 
localised damage 
20k - 100k £ 
minor replacement 
needed (operation loss 
< 1 day 
D (critical) multiple major 
injuries 
critical damage/pollution, 
minimal effect of control 
measures (more than a 
month) 
major damage 
100k-3M £ 
major repair needed 
(operation loss 1 day-
week) 
E (catastrophic) 1 or more 
fatalities 
Significant environmental 
impact, massive pollution 
(more than a year) 
damage >3 M, 
total loss 
total operation loss, 
replacement 
 
Regarding the consequences categories, it is assumed 
that one major injury is equal to 10 minor injuries while 
one fatality is equal to 10 major injuries. In terms of the 
probability ranking, it is divided into five categories: 1 
(extremely unlikely), 2 (remote), 3 (occasional), 4 
(probable) and 5 (very frequent). The probability 
ranking is carried out in terms of the entire project and 
of a single device as well bearing in mind that the full 
project scale includes an array of 30 devices while the 
operational lifespan of each device is assumed as 20 
years. Based on the above, the quantitative probability 
ranking is shown in the last column of Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Risk probability categories 
 Ranking Description Quantification 
1 extremely unlikely 1 event/project lifetime 1.39E-04 
2 remote several events/project lifetime 4.17E-04 
3 occasional 1 event/device lifetime 4.17E-03 
4 probable several events/device lifetime 4.17E-02 
5 very frequent 1 event/device month 4.17E-01 
 
It is important to notice that the quantitative values for 
each one of the ranking levels are derived from 
following equations: 
 
P = 1 / D    (1) 
 
D = 12 * T * N    (2) 
 
where: 
P = probability 
D = duration (in months) 
T = active operational time of a single device (years) 
N = envisaged number of devices employed in the full-
scale project (20 devices to be employed overall) 
 
Having all the above in mind, a risk matrix is 
developed related to the previously mentioned areas in 
order to provide the ranking of the potential hazards as 
well as identify their risk level. Overall, risk ranking is 
identified as the outcome of consequence and 
probability of occurrence of the mentioned 
consequences. Table 3 presents the suggested risk 
matrix showing the four distinctive areas of risk 
ranking. 
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Table 3: Risk matrix for the Deep Green device 
Probability 
Conseq 1 2 3 4 5 
A A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 
B B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 
C C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
D D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 
E E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
 
As shown, four risk levels have been created. These are 
defined as low, moderate, significant and high (Table 
4). 
 
Table 4: Risk index table for the risk analysis of the 
Deep Green device 
Risk index table 
Level 1 Low (negligible risk) 
Level 2 Moderate (tolerable risk) 
Level 3 Significant (tolerable, specific measures in 
place) 
Level 4 High (intolerable risk) 
 
• Level 1: Low (negligible risk) 
• Level 2: Moderate (tolerable risk) 
• Level 3: Significant (tolerable risk with specific 
measures in place to prevent/mitigate the 
potential risks) 
• Level 4: High (intolerable risk) 
 
The risk matrix is developed in such a way as to 
demonstrate the various risk levels involved in this 
innovative power generation project. At this point it 
should be mentioned that the last level (Level 4: 
intolerable risk) has been expanded to include all cases 
in which, risk of one or more fatalities is present (boxes 
E1 and E2) to emphasize the importance of it. Bearing 
the above in mind, the presentation of the overall 
HAZID process follows next. 
 
3.3 HAZID presentation 
 
In this section, the Hazard Identification (HAZID) for 
the offshore installation, operation and maintenance 
activities of the Deep Green device as well as of the 
Deep Green project are shown. For a complete 
representation of all the potential risks involved in these 
activities, the direct as well as the indirect hazards are 
analysed. Direct hazards involve the ones directly 
related to the Deep Green such as lifting operations, 
occupational and health hazards, operation of ROVs 
etc. Indirect hazards involve the ones related to the 
overall installation activity including the installation 
vessel and its crew (e.g. fire on board the vessel, hot 
weather, etc.) bearing in mind the operational 
environment of the Deep Green in a worldwide context. 
In these terms, the following areas are examined for the 
installation phase of the project: 
 
1. Lifting operations offshore 
2. Seakeeping 
3. Vessel stability 
4. Other vessel in the vicinity 
5. Floating device/equipment 
6. Operation of ROVs 
7. Occupational hazards 
8. General health hazards 
9. General environmental hazards 
10. Fire 
11. Construction works (foundation, etc.) 
 
For the operation phase of the project, the 
complete/partial loss of operation of the device is 
examined separately. For the maintenance activities of 
the project, the Deep Green device is examined together 
with any other activities related to it such as lifting 
operations, occupational and health hazards etc. In this 
case, the hazards identified as well as the potential risks 
and the proposed mitigation measures are similar to the 
ones identified for the installation offshore activities. 
The above are summarised in Fig. 3. 
 
In addition to the above, for each one of the different 
areas/topics identified, all the potential hazards (what 
can go wrong?) are listed. Furthermore, each hazard is 
investigated in terms of the following: 
• Cause (why can it go wrong) 
• Consequences of mentioned hazard (which are 
the end-results) 
• Consequence index 
• Probability index 
• Overall risk index 
• Risk control options 
• Remarks 
 
The consequence, probability and consecutively the risk 
index are examined in terms of: 
• Personnel safety (S) 
• Environmental protection (E) 
• Asset integrity (A) and 
• Device operation (O) 
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Figure 3: Summary presentation of the Hazard Identification (HAZID) for the offshore installation, operation and 
maintenance activities of the Deep Green device 
 
 
Bearing in mind all the above, a part of the HAZID 
approach is shown in Table 5 while the full detailed 
HAZID process for the offshore installation, operation 
and maintenance activities is fully demonstrated in 
[20]. 
 
Furthermore, although it is envisaged that divers will 
not be employed during the installation and 
construction works of the full scale device (as well as 
for the entire Deep Green project site) in order to 
reduce hazards and associated risks, commercial divers 
may be utilized in the installation activities of the 1/10 
scale model device. In this respect, diving operations 
will be carried out at shallow water depths. Although 
the aforementioned diving operations will not require 
saturation diving procedures and equipment and 
accordingly will not necessitate the corresponding 
safety measures taken and related hazards identified, a 
HAZID analysis has been performed for the shallow 
water diving operations executed. To this end, [20] 
describes the hazards originating from the referred 
diving operations. 
 
Additionally, different options regarding the vessel to 
be employed for the installation and maintenance 
activities of the Deep Green device were considered. 
These included either a specialised offshore vessel or 
any other ordinary vessel (e.g. fishing vessel). In the 
first case, the HAZID analysis is a prerequisite for the 
actual operation of the vessel and the operator of the 
vessel should comply with all statutory and 
Classification Society requirements. In the latter case, 
an ordinary vessel may consist of the usual marine crew 
(Captain, Engineer/s, Able and/or Ordinary seamen), 
which may not have the specific experience required in 
the offshore operations (e.g. heavy lifting, diving 
operations, etc.). In this case, a precise and detailed 
HAZID analysis was deemed necessary for the 
purposes of the installation, operation and maintenance 
activities at the overall Deep Green site including all 
potential hazards that could be developed in any 
particular circumstances. 
 
 
HAZID approach for offshore 
activities of Deep Green device 
Installation Operation Maintenance
• Lif ting operations 
of fshore
• Seakeeping
• Vessel stability
• Other vessel in the 
vicinity
• Floating 
device/equipment
• Operation of  ROVs
• Occupational hazards
• General health hazards
• General environmental 
hazards
• Fire
• Construction works 
(foundation, etc)
• Deep Green device 
complete loss of  operation
• Deep Green partial loss of  
operation
• Deep Green device
• Lif ting operations during 
maintenance
• Other vessel in the 
vicinity
• Floating 
device/equipment
• Operation of  ROVs
• Occupational hazards
• General health hazards
• General environmental 
hazards
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Table 5: Part of the Hazard Identification process for the lifting operations of the offshore installation of the Deep Green device 
Installation of device 
offshore     
Consequence 
index 
Probability 
index 
Risk index 
    
Undesired event / 
Hazard 
Cause Consequences S E A O S E A O S E A O Risk control 
options/measures 
Remarks 
Dropped/swinging 
equipment/device/tether
s while installing, 
lowering/retrieving 
from water 
Rigging failure Injury/fatality, 
environmental damage, 
device/tethers/equipment 
damage/loss, operational 
time delay/loss 
D B C A 2 2 2 2 D2 B2 C2 A2 
Certified rigging, inspection 
& maintenance of cranes 
Environmental 
Management Plan (EMP), 
Safe Job Analysis (SJA) 
carried out where 
necessary 
" 
Crane overload 
" C B C A 2 2 2 2 C2 B2 C2 A2 
The crane is fitted with a 
load cell and cut-outs " 
" 
Mechanical failure 
" C B C A 2 2 2 2 C2 B2 C2 A2 
Crane designed with 
appropriate dynamic factors 
for offshore operation 
" 
" 
Untrained/inexperience 
crane personnel " C B C A 2 2 2 2 C2 B2 C2 A2 
Certified and experienced 
crane operators (specific 
training on ship cranes) 
" 
" 
Wrong rigging practice 
(slings, hooks, shackles) " C B C A 2 2 2 2 C2 B2 C2 A2 
Correct positioning/rigging, 
SJA " 
" 
Incorrect personnel 
positioning " C B C A 2 2 2 2 C2 B2 C2 A2 
Qualified marine/lifting 
operations crew, training " 
" 
Poor communication 
" B B C A 2 2 2 2 B2 B2 C2 A2 
VHF radio communication 
between crane operator, 
deck crew, vessel bridge 
" 
" 
Improper control of 
lifting operation " C B C A 2 2 2 2 C2 B2 C2 A2 
Qualified marine/lifting 
operations crew " 
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Moreover, the results of the HAZID analysis were also 
verified and updated during a workshop carried out at 
the premises of the dpt of NAME at Strathclyde 
university in Glasgow with participants from all 
interested parties of the project consortium. Participants 
included the design company of the Deep Green device, 
a major classification society, the company involved in 
the installation activities of the device as well as a 
major consultancy company specialising in the 
renewables sector. All the above stakeholders 
contributed in a systematic review of the performed 
tasks and the comments originating from the review 
process were taken into account in the formulation of 
the revised version of the present study. 
 
It should be also mentioned that various other hazards 
were identified at the initial HAZID stage such as e.g. 
rapture of oil & gas pipelines, subsea cables and impact 
to archaeological sites, ruins, shipwrecks, etc. Such 
areas of concern are not included in the current risk 
analysis study since these potentially hazardous areas 
are considered at the initial phase of the site selection of 
the Deep Green project (including the development of 
the Environmental Impact Assessment study) and they 
are dealt with in detail at that project stage. 
 
4. HAZID ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
In this section of the present paper, the results of the 
HAZID analysis are shown. These include all the high-
ranked identified hazards (Level 3 and Level 4) for 
each one of the activities of the Deep Green device 
mentioned (Installation, Operation and Maintenance) 
for all the different consequence categories i.e. 
personnel Safety (S), Environmental protection (E), 
Asset integrity (A) and device Operation (O). A small 
part of the above are shown in Table 6. 
 
As discussed before, a full and detailed list of all the 
high-ranked hazards identified during the HAZID 
analysis for the offshore Installation, Operation and 
Maintenance of the device was created and is shown in 
[20]. In it, mitigation and/or prevention measures are 
also suggested in order to avoid the unwanted hazards 
for the mentioned activities. 
 
 
Table 6: Part of the HAZID analysis results for the Deep Green device 
   Risk index 
Examined 
area/topic Undesired event / Hazard Cause S E A O 
1. Lifting operations Dropped/swinging 
equipment/device/tethers while 
installing, lowering/retrieving 
from water 
Rigging failure 
D2 
      
  " 
Poor communication B4 B4 B4   
  " 
Swinging due to vessel motions C3   C3   
  
Snagging Excessive/unknown load weight D2       
  
" 
High dynamic load during lifting 
operations D2       
  " 
Bad weather D2   D2   
  " 
Vessel motions D2       
2. Seakeeping Severe vessel movements Severe sea conditions, vessel 
motion responses D2       
3. Vessel stability Stability loss Cargo shifting   D2     
  " 
Severe weather 
  D2     
4. Other vessel in the 
vicinity 
Contact/collision Watch-keeping error, not following 
procedures D2       
  " 
Mechanical failure propulsion, 
steering) D2       
  " Bad weather D3       
  " Poor communication D2       
  
" 
High vessel density (e.g. fishing, 
leisure, working vessels) D2       
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In these terms, the following are the highest ranked 
hazards for all mentioned offshore activities: 
• Occupational hazards: Exposure to hazards 
from entry into confined spaces (tanks, store rooms, 
etc.) 
 
• Fire: 
• Fire in E/R & machinery spaces (switch 
gear, steering gear, ROV area, etc.) 
• Hot work leading to ignition of flammable 
substances 
• Bunkering leakage and ignition 
 
For the examined area/topic of the Deep Green device 
complete/partial loss of operation, the following high 
hazardous areas are identified: 
• Fire in the device (Faulty cabling, fuses, 
electrical failure) 
• Grid power loss (Onshore power loss/causes) 
• Catastrophic device failure for the wing, nacelle, 
tether, joints, swivel, foundation (Manufacturing 
fault, cracks, structural fatigue, fire, 
wing/nacelle flooding, tether joints collapse, 
waves axial forces on tether, etc..) 
• Cables collapse (Cables overstressing, fatigue, 
manufacturing fault) 
• Seabed collapse/erosion (Unstable soil/seabed 
condition) 
 
Moreover, the overall results of the HAZID approach 
regarding the different areas of the offshore activities of 
the Deep Green are summarised below. These are 
distinguished in the high-ranked risks concerning the 
Deep Green itself as well as more generic areas of 
concern regarding the entire Deep Green project. The 
hazard list will be presented next in accordance with the 
risk consequence level to the overall operation of the 
project. Starting with the offshore installation of the 
device, the primary identified hazards are as follows: 
 
for lifting operations 
• Dropped/swinging equipment/device/tethers 
while installing, lowering/retrieving from water: 
certified rigging can be used together with 
inspection and maintenance routine of cranes 
• Snagging of lifting equipment due to high 
dynamic or excessive static loading, bad weather 
or vessel motions: Lift plan and correct lifting 
procedures may be employed as well as crane 
operational limits monitored 
 
for construction works (foundation, etc.) 
• Dropped/swinging equipment/foundation while 
installing, lowering/retrieving from water: 
adequate procedures in place, competent 
personnel, secure rigging is a prerequisite in 
addition to Environmental Management Plan 
(EMP) and Safe Job Analysis (SJA) carried out 
where necessary 
• Wrong installation of device: use of ROVs is 
suggested in this case together with following 
project installation plan in its full extent 
• Entangled cables around foundation during 
installation procedure: specific installation 
procedure followed, ROV deployment when 
required 
 
for the operations of ROVs 
• ROV operations interfere with device/ vessel 
operations: good communication and 
supervision plan among team members 
• Dropped/swinging ROV: adequate procedures in 
place should be used, competent personnel 
employed and secure rigging engaged 
 
Floating device/equipment and the hazard of contact 
collision: potential damage to the device as the its size 
is small compared to vessel used for installation 
purposes 
 
Regarding occupational hazards 
• Personnel slips, trips and falls during installation 
offshore: safety working procedures should be in 
place, work risk assessment carried out as per 
offshore operations, harnesses used where 
needed, daily inspections carried out as well as 
good housekeeping onboard the vessel 
• Man Over Board (MOB) incident: inspection 
and maintenance of equipment performed, 
adequate training of all personnel/crew involved 
in the operations and harnesses/life jackets used 
at all times 
 
for health hazards 
• Exposure to toxic gases from various chemicals 
used, etc.: crew/personnel training on chemicals 
use, PPE used, operational vents in place, 
inspection and maintenance of 
engines/equipment/sewage system 
 
for general environmental hazards 
• various types of pollution occurring from the 
vessel used and controlled by environmental 
management plans in place 
 
in general for the vessel employed for the installation 
activities offshore 
• Cargo shifting and severe weather encountered: 
proper sea-fastening used and management 
procedures in place addressed 
 
Other vessel/s in the vicinity 
• Contact/collision with other vessels: in this case 
a number of control options may include 
competent marine crew , proper watch keeping, 
inspection and maintenance procedures in place 
and DP capability among others 
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Regarding the Deep Green operation in the offshore 
environment, the high-risk areas identified and the risk 
control options/measures suggested are: 
• Fire in the device: in this case, sensors should be 
used to detect any anomalies regarding voltage, 
temperature as well as fire-proof compartments 
and materials utilized 
• Grid power loss: In this case, power redundancy 
(batteries used) will be needed while the generator 
may operate as a motor to drive the device in the 
‘parking’ position 
• Catastrophic device failure (wing, nacelle, tether, 
joints, swivel, foundation): For this hazard, a 
robust design should be a high priority as well as 
close monitoring, inspection and maintenance of 
the device and its operation performed 
• Cables collapse: proper design, monitoring and 
inspection of cables followed by the technical 
details presented in the FMEA of the present study 
• Seabed collapse/erosion: seismic and geophysical 
surveys should be conducted as well as scouring 
protection applied 
 
In the field of the offshore maintenance of the device, 
particular attention should be attributed to: 
• Lose track of device after surfacing: in this case 
reflective materials for the Deep Green could be 
used or other measures taken such as lights 
activated when surfacing as well as AIS 
transducer used in extreme cases 
• Cables twisted/broken during maintenance 
operations: the device could be controlled to stay 
in 'parking' position or use cable cylinders near 
foundation to store slack cable 
• Device tangled with tethers: in this case as well 
control options in place to enhance the controlling 
of the device, control system kicks-in on time 
• Device not stabilised or maintaining 'parking' 
position: redundant control mechanism while 
device operational environment speed maintained 
at 1.5-1.7 m/sec 
• Blades not stable/moving during retrieving device 
for maintenance: redundant control mechanism 
provided while maintenance is carried out during 
slack water 
• Quick release mechanism malfunctioning/not 
working: robust design of quick release 
mechanism, inspection and monitoring at 
predefined intervals 
• Bad weather conditions during maintenance 
operations: follow safety and operational 
procedures. In extreme cases, take additional 
safety measures 
• Unexpected maintenance tasks occurring: floating 
balloon with radar reflectors for recovery of the 
device may be a risk control option 
 
In terms of the diving operations, which might be 
needed in the case of installing and operating a device 
under scale in shallow waters, they are all classified as 
very hazardous as diving on its own is a high-risk 
activity. Particular attention should be given to: 
• Hazards during routine diver deployment/retrieval 
• Emergencies occurring while divers are in the 
water 
• Undesired interaction between divers, device and 
ROVs 
 
All the above-identified hazards are the higher ranked 
ones shown in the list of the overall HAZID analysis 
presented in this study. For more details, the reader is 
prompted to examine the detailed HAZID analysis 
included in [20]. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This section discusses and provides insight into the 
conclusions and recommendations of the research 
presented in this study for one of the first stages of the 
innovative Deep Green project; that is the risk 
assessment for installation and service operations of the 
Seakite device. It also indicates the way for further 
research in this area. At this point, it is important to 
note that the study performed so far is the outcome of 
the initial design specifications and considerations 
regarding the overall operation of the innovative tidal 
power-converting device. The stage of the initial 
concept design is an iterative process, which 
necessitates re-thinking and re-working in order to 
finalise the details of the device and which, 
consequently will prove beneficial when re-visiting and 
updating the current study. Bearing the above in mind, 
the present study can be updated and expanded to 
include more details of the Deep Green device and the 
overall Deep Green project when the initial design will 
be further established and finalised. In these terms, the 
key elements of the work carried out and presented in 
this report are the following: 
 
• Review of risk analysis and risk assessment 
methods and tools in the renewables, maritime 
and other industrial sectors 
• Presentation of a risk analysis and decision 
making methodology to be followed for the 
Deep Green device and the overall Deep Green 
project 
• Development of a thorough risk matrix to be 
used for the installation, operation and 
maintenance activities of the Deep Green 
• Identification of the hazards in the installation, 
operation and maintenance activities of the 
device 
• Identification of the high-ranked hazardous 
areas for the mentioned activities 
 
In addition to the above, the research study conducted 
herein provides a rigid foundation for expanding into 
further research in the mentioned areas. Some of the 
recommendations that may enhance the proposed 
methodology are mentioned next: 
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• The overall Deep Green project activity 
areas/processes may further include the 
examination and risk assessment of the device 
transportation at sea (e.g. towing), and finally 
decommissioning and dismantling if applicable 
• Regarding the hazard identification process, it 
may be expanded to include another consequence 
category and accordingly another risk category in 
terms of the reputation of the company involved 
• Hazards and potential risks regarding diving 
operations have not been included in the present 
study (the use of divers will be avoided as much 
as possible while the use of ROVs will be 
preferred) but can be easily incorporated in the 
HAZID study 
• Employ reliability tools such as Dynamic Fault 
Tree Analysis [21], [22]. The latter can be 
performed in either a qualitative or a quantitative 
way to examine the reliability and criticality 
aspects of the entire device as well as of its sub-
systems and end-parts 
• Include other system equipment such as array and 
export cables, transformer, grid connection, etc. if 
this is required 
• Particular attention should be also drawn to 
various options regarding the employment of 
qualified and experienced sub-contractors for the 
installation and/or maintenance activities of the 
Deep Green device offshore. 
• The Deep Green device may be also assessed 
according to the equipment that will be used i.e. 
innovative and/or existing equipment technology. 
In this respect, [23] provides a framework for 
carrying out this activity.  
• Further studies can be performed in order to 
address the development of methods for handling 
of the full scale SeaKite during service and 
maintenance operation as well as its associated 
cost from the above-mentioned operations. 
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